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EXPORT CONTROLS TO CHINA:
AN EMERGING TREND FOR DUAL--USE EXPORTS
Sally A. Meese*
Throughout the 1970's, the deepening split in Sino-Soviet relations
offered the United States the opportunity to exercise diplomatic leverage on
the Soviet Union by selling items to China which might aid the Chinese in
the modernization of their economic and military establishments while
placing an embargo on the sale of those same items to other Communist
nations. However, as long as an atmosphere of detente between the United
States and the Soviet Union prevailed, even-handedness toward Communist
nations continued to be the official U.S. trade position.
As the 1970's drew to a close, serious strains appeared in the American
relationship with the Soviet Union.' In response, United States export control
policy began an unofficial "tilt" toward China in the 1980's that has resulted
in allowing China greater access to high-technology items than any other
Communist country.2 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had the effect of
making this unofficial "tilt" the new policy - a policy that might be termed a
"China Preferential."
This latest expansion, officials said, grows out of the basic decision to
sell China militarily useful equipment - though not weapons. The
decision was made by President Carter early in January 1980, shortly
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and on the eve of Defense
* B.A., Rutgers/Douglass College, 1975; J.D., Georgetown University Law
School, 1980; L.L.M. (expected), Georgetown University Law School (International
Comparative Law), 1983; currently an attorney in the Bureau of Oceans and Interna-
tional Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State. This article
expresses the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the official view of
any governmental agency.
1. William Safire, "Russia's Threat to China," N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1980, at A21.
2. Indeed, President Carter set even more restrictive criteria to control high tech-
nology exports to the Soviet Union in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The new guidelines imposed tighter controls in such areas as computers and software,
manufacturing technology, and materials critical to the manufacture of high technolo-
gy defense goods. Those added restrictions followed a series of earlier responses to the
invasion of Afghanistan, which included revocations and denials of high-technology
export licenses; controls on the export of grain and certain agricultural products; an
embargo on the sale of phosphates for fertilizer; and severe restrictions on the sale of
technology to produce equipment used in oil and gas production. See Press release,
"President Sets Tougher Criteria on High Technology Exports to the U.S.S.R.," U.S.
Department of Commerce News, March 19, 1980.
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Secretary Harold Brown's trip to Peking. On that trip, Brown said
Washington had made it clear to Peking that the United States would
consider, on a case-by-case basis, sales of technology and equipment that
could have dual use, meaning military as well as civilian .. .I
With the dawning of the Reagan Administration, this policy was again
publicly expressed, and was expanded in scope during Secretary of State
Haig's June 1981 trip to Peking.'
As a result of this new "China Preferential," American exporters are
faced with only a partially defined policy toward trade with China. U.S.
export policy is made even more complex by the emergence of China as an
informal ally of the United States in its rivalry with the Soviet Union, and
the resulting American interest in modernizing China's military capabilities.
In spite of this interest, American firms wishing to export to China are
potentially hindered by American laws and export regulations. The purpose
of this article is to aid exporters by:
(1) presenting a brief summary of the evolution of the United States
export control system;
(2) explaining the various regulatory licensing procedures with which
an American exporter might comply in light of the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979 and related legislation on U.S. trade with China;
and
(3) by assessing future prospects for U.S.-China trade in view of the
current Reagan Administration policy.
I. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
EXPoRT CONTROL SYSTEM
The present United States national security export control system had
its origin in the controls adopted during the Second World War on the export
from the United States of goods and commodities needed for the war effort. In
3. Getler, "U.S. Willing to Sell China Copters, Transport Planes," Wash. Post,
March 19, 1980, § A, at 2 (emphasis added). See also Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1980, at 22.
4. See Marder, "The China Policy that Isn't," Wash. Post, June 14, 1981, § C, at 1,
5; Oberdorfer and Weisskopf, "U.S. Reaches Accord with China on Arms Sales," Wash.
Post, June 17, 1981, § A, at 1; Oberdorfer and Branigin, "Haig Promises to Consult
Allies on Sales to China," Wash. Post, June 20, 1981, § A, at 1, 10; "Secretary Haig
Plays China Card in Spades," N.Y. Times, June 21, 1981, § 4, at 1; Lescaze, "House
Panel Urges Care in Arms Sale to China, Taiwan," Wash. Post, June 21, 1981, § A, at
9; and Gwertzman, "Haig Rejects Moscow Criticism of New China Arms Policy," N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1981, § A, at 3.
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the immediate post-war period, these controls were continued as the United
States attempted to maintain an efficient and equitable distribution of
desperately needed raw materials to the war-devastated nations of Europe
and Asia. By 1948, the deterioration of relations between the West and the
Soviet Union had resulted in the addition of special controls on the shipment
of certain strategic items to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
and Eastern Europe. These controls were tightened after events such as the
Berlin Blockade, the Communist takeover of China and the outbreak of the
Korean War., In effect, virtually all American exports to what came to be
known as the "Soviet Bloc" were embargoed.
Initially, national security export controls to Eastern Europe and the
USSR had been imposed under the Second Decontrol Act of 1947,6 but the
need for a new law specifically aimed at national security considerations soon
resulted in the passage of the Export Control Act of 1949.7 This Act was the
governing statute for United States export control efforts for all purposes
(national security, short supply and foreign policy) for two decades until it
was superseded by the Export Administration Act of 1969.8
Beginning in 1949, through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM), U.S. allies in Western Europe followed the
5. For an excellent background on the U.S. trade embargo with China between
1949-1970, see Lee and McCobb, United States Trade Embargo on China, 1949-1970;
Legal Status and Future Prospects, 4 J. OF INT'L LAW & POL., 1, 28 (1971).
6. Second Decontrol Act of 1947, P.L. No. 80-188, Ch. 248, 61 Stat. 321 (July 15,
1947).
7. Export Control Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1951) (expired Dec.
31, 1969). For a good review of the background of the 1949 Act, see Comment, Export
Controls, 58 YALE L.J. 1325 (1949).
8. Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976)
(expired Sept. 30, 1979).
9. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) is the
informal multilateral organization through which the United States and its allies
attempt to coordinate the national controls they apply over the export of strategic
materials and technology to the Communist world. It was conceived in postwar discus-
sions between the United States, Britain, and France. By 1948, the United States Gov-
ernment had begun to enlist the cooperation of other West European allies for a coor-
dinated embargo policy against the Communist bloc. Early negotiations on this matter
were private and informal, but they were given impetus by the events of 1948-49: the
proclamation of China, the Berlin crisis, the Tito-Stalin split, and the explosion of the
Soviet atomic bomb. As East-West tensions grew, the coordination of export controls
took on increasing importance. See, Technology and East-West Trade, Office of Tech-
nology Assessment (OTA), U.S. Congress, Nov. 1979 at 153; see also, Adler-Karlsson,
International Economic Power: The United States Strategic Embargo, 6 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 501, 504 (1972); and Chin Kim, The COCOM Case, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L.,
604-607 (1970).
EXPORT CONTROLS TO CHINA
United States' lead in imposing tight controls on exports to the "Soviet Bloc."
With the end of the Korean War and the death of Stalin, however, trade
restrictions to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were relaxed, especially
by America's COCOM allies. Nevertheless, the total embargo on trade with
China remained. This greater level of control on trade with China as
compared to trade with other Communist nations became known as the
"China Differential."
In the late 1950's, this "Differential" was abandoned by America's
COCOM partners in favor of a more even-handed approach to trade with
China vis-a-vis other Communist nations. While controls were still main-
tained on what were considered to be strategic items, COCOM nations other
than the United States applied the controls equally to all nations of the
"Soviet Bloc" and to Communist China. The United States, meanwhile,
continued to maintain highly restrictive controls on trade with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, and an almost total embargo on trade with
China. By 1968, the United States had become the only country still actively
engaged in "economic warfare" against the Communists; it had unilaterally
restricted the export of 1,100 items that were freely available to Communist
countries from COCOM nations and other sources.10 Thus, at the beginning of
the Nixon Administration, the "China Differential" was still in place as the
basis for U.S. export control policy toward China.
Diplomatic initiatives by the Nixon Administration opened a new era in
Sino-American relations. Those initiatives resulted in the adoption of a more
even-handed approach to the licensing of exports to China vis-a-vis other
Communist nations. At the same time, the emergence of detente with the
Soviet Union resulted in a reduction of controls on trade with Eastern Europe
and the USSR. In 1972, the United States' controls on exports to Communist
countries were cut back to a level much closer to that maintained by the
other COCOM member nations. By 1981, the Reagan Administration had
committed itself toward achievement of formal differentiation between China
and the Warsaw Pact in the COCOM."
10. Gosain, Export Licensing of Advanced Technology to Communist Countries:
Problems and Prospects, 1 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 305, 309 (1978).
11. The growing differentiation between the Warsaw Pact and China entailed in
this new approach prompted Senate Banking Committee Chairman Jake Garn to cau-
tion that "while both the United States and the P.R.C. are opposed to the Soviet goals
of world domination, the P.R.C. is a communist nation with which we have fun-
damental differences". In Garn's view, the United States should not sell to China pro-
cess knowhow nor items susceptible to easy reverse engineering. The House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs also cautioned President Reagan on
arms sales to China stating that such a step could be seen provocatively by the Soviet
Union, could cause concern among our allies in the region and, once taken, would be
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II. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979 AND
THE SCOPE OF ITS EXPORT CONTROLS
On September 29, 1979, President Carter signed into law the Export
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979.12 In addition to revising the Export
Administration Act of 1969, the EAA of 1979 superseded the Mutual Defense
Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act).1" In essence, the EAA of 1979
further defined the contour of United States export controls by eliminating
some antiquated controls that had been present in U.S. law and by
presenting a more flexible approach to the control of exports to Communist
countries.
Prior to the EAA of 1979, government officials had encountered difficulty
in determining appropriate export limitations. This difficulty was caused by
national security considerations, or more specifically, by problems in
determining what technology exports should be denied to Communist
countries. These problems prompted Congress to revise its statutory scheme
for export controls.
In the EAA of 1979,14 Congress attempted to balance conflicting policies.
The need for greater business opportunities was balanced against the need to
restrict the exportation of goods and technology that would "make a
significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation or
nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the U.S. 15
To effectuate this balance and to serve national security considerations, the
EAA of 1979 fixed conditions on the imposition of export controls -
ostensibly for foreign policy purposes. The EAA requires that before
determining what controls to impose, the President is to consider the
following factors:
very difficult to reverse. See "China: Control Policy Changes Outlined by Haig", BNA
- Export Weekly #363, June 23, 1981, p. A-3.
12. Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, Sept. 29, 1979, 93
Stat. 503, codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-2420 (West Supp. 1981).
13. Following the end of World War II, the United States commenced unilateral
and multilateral trade restrictions on Communist countries. In this manner, the U.S.
believed it was responding to what it perceived as an aggressive and monolithic
aggregation of Communist countries and that a policy of "containment" would halt
Communist expansion and create preconditions for the eventual dissolution of the com-
munist system. Export controls thus became instrumental in the implementation of
this containment policy. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle
Act) was the first piece of trade control legislation to deal explicitly with trade to
Communist countries.
14. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2402 (West Supp. 1981).
15. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2402(2)(A) (West Supp. 1981).
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(1) the probability that controls will achieve their intended purpose in
light of such factors as availability from other countries of items to
be controlled;
(2) the compatability with overall policy toward the targeted country;
(3) the reactions of other countries;
(4) the trade effects;
(5) the enforceability; and
(6) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls.'"
In addition, the President must consult with affected U.S. industries and
determine that reasonable efforts have been made to achieve the purposes of
the controls through negotiation or other alternative means. Finally, the
President "in every possible instance" is to consult with Congress. It is
improbable, however, that Congress will obstruct future trade exchanges due
to the lack of a direct veto mechanism. At present, there is no legislative
vehicle that can be utilized to block technology transfers other than passage
of a specific bill designed to amend the Export Administration Act. It is
interesting to note that although Section 36B of the Arms Export Control Act
provides Congressional override on arms sales, it contains no provisions
regarding technology transfer.
A. TYPES OF EXPORT LICENSES
The major types of licenses involved in trade with China are the general
license (with various sub-license types)," the validated license,'8 and the
16. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2405(b) (West Supp. 1981).
17. The general license permits export of certain commodities and technical data
without filing an application with the Office of Export Administration (OEA). The two
major types of general licenses are the general and specific.
(1) The general, e.g., G-DEST (certain product exports to all destinations) autho-
rizes the export of any commodity listed on the Commodity Control List to any
destination for which a validated license is not required.
(2) The specific, e.g., GLV (small value exports) authorizes the export in a single
shipment of any commodity on the Commodity Control List.
18. The validated license requires a document issued by, or under the authority of,
the OEA, authorizing a specific export. An application must be filed with the OEA
setting forth the details of the contemplated transaction. An individual license autho-
rizes exports of specific products or data to a specific consignee and a project license
authorizes exports of products or data required for a specific activity or "project"
abroad. The distribution license authorizes exports of certain products to approved con-
signees in specific countries who are distributors or end-users; the service supply
license authorizes exports of spares and replacement parts to service U.S. equipment.
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qualified general license. 9 A validated license, as its name implies, requires
specific authorization whereas general licenses do not require any export
license application. Whether a shipment is to be made under a validated or
under a general license depends generally upon a combination of two factors
- the specific commodity or technical data to be exported and its
destination.' In other words, the world's nations are divided into various
groups, and the interrelationship of the country group with the commodity
intended for export determines whether or not a validated or general license
is applicable.
The qualified general license is a new license category that was devised
in an effort to simplify and expedite the export administration procedure.
Essentially, it is a "general" license with validated license characteristics,
involving both an application and a document issued by the Office of Export
Administration. It authorizes multiple shipments of a given item to a
particular destination.
American firms exporting a product or technology listed on the U.S.
Commodity Control List (CCL)2' to a destination which is also on the list, are
19. MEYER, REGULATORY CONTEXT, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LICENSING, RESTRICTIONS & ENFORCEMENT, at 89 (1980).
20. SURREY, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, at 61
(1963).
21. The Commodity Control List presently contains approximately 200 entries,
grouped in the following ten categories:
Group 0: Metal-Working Machinery
-Forming Machines
-Other Metal-Working Machinery
Group 1: Chemical & Petroleum Equipment
-Specialized Processing Equipment
-Pumps and Valves
-Other Chemical Equipment
Group 2: Electrial & Power-Generating Equipment
Group 3: General Industrial Equipment
-Metallurgical, Mill & Foundry Equipment
-Equipment for Other Specific Industries
Group 4: Transportation Equipment
-Marine Equipment
-Aviation Equipment
-Other Equipment
Group 5: Electonics & Precision Instruments
-Radio, Radar & Other Telecommunications Apparatus
-Other Related Equipment & Parts for Radio, Radar, & Telecommunications
Apparatus
-Other Electronic Apparatus & Precision Instruments
Group 6: Metals, Minerals & Their Manufactures
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required by the EAA of 1979 to apply to the Department of Commerce for a
"validated" export control license. These licenses are granted on a case-by-
case basis and must be supported by a comprehensive explanation of the
transaction, including the parties, the destination, the type and quantity of
goods or technology being exported, and the end use of the export.2
Although other governmental offices regulate the export of some
specialized commodities and data,n all applications for validated export
Group 7: Chemicals, Metalloids, & Petroleum Products
-Chemicals and Metalloids
-Petroleum, Natural Gases, & Products derived therefrom
Group 8: Rubber & Rubber Products
Group 9: Miscellaneous
22. These licenses are published in the "Comprehensive Export Schedules" of the
Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. See also Pound, "Curbs on Technology
Exports Hurt by Gaps in Enforcement," N.Y. Times, § A at 1, 24, October 14, 1981. The
Pound article is part of an investigation by the N.Y. Times into the transfer abroad of
advanced technology, military equipment and expertise by former United States in-
telligence agents and military officials. The Times series points up issues involving
Federal control over such transfers, how they were made and the role of the C.I.A. in
the activities of Edwin P. Wilson, a former agent. Mr. Wilson and another former agent
were indicted in 1980 on charges of exporting explosives to Libya to help train terror-
ists.
23. See 15 C.F.R. § 372.4(b). Whereas the Department of Commerce is primarily
concerned with the economic and commercial implications of export control, other gov-
ernmental offices administer control over commodities and data that come within their
special regulatory jurisdiction. The CCL does not apply to these specialized commod-
ities and data. Rather, each regulating office promulgates export regulations for the
commodities and technical data under its jurisdiction. These other governmental offices
and the commodities and data they regulate are as follows:
Arms, ammunition, and implements of war are regulated by the Office of Muni-
tions Control, U.S. Department of State.
Narcotic drugs and marijuana are regulated by the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, U.S. Department of Justice.
Specified materials and facilities related to the production of atomic energy are
regulated by the Division of State and Licensee Regulations, U.S. Energy Re-
search and Development Agency, except that components for the facilities are
regulated by the Office of Export Administration.
Watercraft owned by citizens of the United States are regulated by the U.S. Mari-
time Administration; but additional approval is required by the Department of
State for vessels of war, as defined in the U.S. munitions list, and by the Office of
Export Administration if the watercraft is to be reduced to scrap metal.
Natural gas and electric power are regulated by the Federal Power Commission.
Tobacco seeds and live tobacco plants are regulated by the Consumer Marketing
Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Migratory birds and endangered native fish and wildlife are protected by the
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior.
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licenses are submitted to the Commerce Department's Office of Export
Administration (OEA). 4 Most applications are approved by the OEA without
referral to other agencies.' However, if OEA is unable to grant the license
routinely, the application is referred directly to the agencies that possess
special expertise in the technologies involved in, or the issues raised by, the
application.16 One referral contemplated by this procedure is a referral to the
Secretary of Defense "to review any proposed export of any goods or
technology to any country to which exports are controlled for national
security purposes" (basically all Communist nations)." If the President
Finally, the Treasury Department has promulgated several sets of regulations,
administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control that act as a check on the Export
Administration Regulations. The Foreign Assets Control Regulations (Vietnam), the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, and the Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations require
the exporter to obtain an additional Treasury Department license for exports to the
respective countries. However, exports that have been licensed by the Office of Export
Administration are generally licensed as a matter of course by the Treasury Depart-
ment. The Transaction Control Regulations require the exporter to obtain Treasury
Department authorization for export of commodities on COCOM's list of international-
ly embargoed strategic goods.
The Department of State is still chiefly concerned with foreign policy considera-
tions of export control. State advises Commerce on foreign policy directions, represents
the U.S. in all COCOM sessions and has primary responsibility for the development
and administration of the Munitions Control List which is used to control the export of
items of primarily military use. The export of such items is embargoed to Communist
countries.
24. See Remarks of Bo Denysyk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Adminis-
tration Before the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, Department of State,
Washington, D.C., July 8, 1981 at 4: "the Department of Commerce's Office of Export
Administration will function like a service company with its customers being U.S. in-
dustry. I don't know if we will always follow the adage that 'the customer is always
right,' but we will bend over backwards to provide courteous, expeditious, and consis-
tent assistance."
25. See Remarks of Bo Denysyk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Adminis-
tration Before the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, Department of State,
Washington, D.C., July 8, 1981 at 4:
[The Reagan Administration has decided that] validated export licenses not re-
quiring COCOM review will be processed by the Department of Commerce. By not
requiring interagency review, we expect a threefold reduction in processing time
for these cases. And, as you know, the majority of trade in high technology, dual
use items is in this category.
See also, Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress, Export
Controls: Need to Clarify Policy and Simplify Administration 1 (ID-79-16) (March 1,
1979) (hereinafter "GAO Report on Export Controls") at 36.
26. Comptroller General of the United States, Report to Congress: Administration
of U.S. Export Licensing Should be Consolidated to be More Responsive to Industry
(ID-78-60) (Oct. 31, 1978) at 3-5 (hereinafter "GAO Report on Export Administration").
27. EAA of 1979 § 10(g), codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2409(g)(West Supp. 1979).
EXPORT CONTROLS TO CHINA
concurs with the Defense Secretary's recommendation that an export should
be prohibited on national security grounds, no export license or other
authority may be issued. 8 However, Presidential concurrence is very rarely
called for.
The Operating Committee, which consists of representatives from the
Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State, 9 plays a central role
in this process. The Department of Treasury also has a representative on the
Committee, but it seldom takes an active role. The Central Intelligence
Agency regularly sends a representative, but generally does not make formal
recommendations." The OEA usually makes the final licensing decision only
after receiving the unanimous consent of the Operating Committee
members."
To formulate its recommendation, each consulting agency determines
whether an application should be referred for technical evaluation.32 For
example, referrals to the Department of Energy (DOE) are received by the
Office of Political-Military Security Affairs.3 It is that office's responsibility
to determine whether to send applications to technicians within DOE, to
resolve any differences among the technicians' recommendations and to
formalize a DOE position on the application.' Similarly, the Department of
State's Office of East-West Trade may refer applications to geographic desk
officers or to a specialized office within the State Department, such as the
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. In the majority of
28. EAA of 1979 § 10(g)(2), codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2409(g)(2) (West Supp.
1979).
29. GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 5. The Operating
Committee meets weekly, handling about fifteen applications per session.
30. GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 5; GAO Report on
Export Controls, supra note 25, at 35-36.
31. GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 3; GAO Report on
Export Controls, supra note 25, at 34.
32. GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 8; GAO Report on
Export Controls, supra note 25, at 37.
33. GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 9; GAO Report on
Export Controls, supra note 25, at 37.
34. See GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 9; GAO Report
on Export Controls, supra note 25, at 37.
35. Crossette, "U.S. Postpones Filling Rights Position," N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1981
at 10.
The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was established by law
in 1977, reflecting the Carter Administration's introduction of the subject as an
issue in foreign policy. . .Any substantive change in the bureau's function would
require Congressional action. ..
The bureau's statutory functions include monitoring human rights in nations re-
ceiving U.S. economic and military aid.
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cases, however, applications are not forwarded for technical review, but are
decided by the office initially receiving the referral. 6
If the OEA declines to accept a recommendation or if the recommenda-
tions are conflicting, the application may be referred to a sub-Advisory
Committee on Export Policy (sub-ACEP) which consists of Deputy Assistant
Secretaries from each of the cognizant departments. 7 If unanimity is not
obtained at that level, the application may be referred to either the Advisory
Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) at the Assistant Secretary level, or more
commonly, to the Export Administration Review Board at the Cabinet level.3
The tendency, however, is to seek and obtain unanimity at the Operating
Committee level.39 Only five referrals were received by the sub-ACEP in
1977, and no applications were forwarded to the ACEP or the Export
Administration Review Board in that year.'"
B. COUNTRY RESTRICTIONS
Until April 1980, China was listed in the regulations implementing the
Export Administration Act, along with the Soviet Union and most Eastern
European countries, in Country Group y.41 China is now in its own category,
See also, GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 9; GAO Report on
Export Controls, supra note 25, at 37-38.
36. See GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 8-9.
37. GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 5; GAO Report on
Export Controls, supra note 25, at 36, 37.
38. See Export Administration Act: Agenda for Reform: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Internation-
al Relations, 95th CONG., 2d SESS. 6-7 (1978) (hereinafter "Agenda for Reform Hearing")
(prepared statement of Frederick W. Huszagh, Executive Director, Dean Rusk Center
for International and Comparative Law, University of Georgia).
39. See GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 8; GAO Report
on Export Controls, supra note 25, at 37.
40. GAO Report on Export Administration, supra note 26, at 5.
41. Country Group Y:
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Estonia
German Democratic Republic (including East Berlin)
Hungary
Laos
Latvia
Lithuania
Outer Mongolia
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
U.S. Department of Commerce, Export Administration Regulations, supp. 1 at
370 (June 1, 1978).
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Country Group P,12 but this is "little more than a status symbol,' ' 3 since the
licensing procedures remain the same. These procedures require that after an
application for a license is filed with the Office of Export Administration
(OEA) of the Department of Commerce, it is to be processed through the U.S.
export control system. Depending upon the nature of the product and its
possible military uses or technology transfer capabilities, the license will be
reviewed by the Commerce Department and other government agencies -
most notably, the Defense Department. If the license is approved for U.S.
export and if the export is on the multilateral COCOM embargo list, the
license will then be reviewed by the fourteen-nation COCOM review
committee in Paris." COCOM controls most of the items listed on the U.S.
Commodity Control List (CCL), but usually has more stringent requirements
for embargo than does the CCL.
C. TIME PARAMETERS
The process of obtaining a license has, in the past, been quite
time-consuming. Critics of the old system called the modus operandi an
"oligopoly . . . . wherein the government bureaus make bargains among
themselves for their own benefit at the expense of the public.",5 It was said
that for a controversial case, clearing all the phases of the export licensing
process required "at the very minimum and under the most optimistic of
administrative scenarios, some 80 days and, at worst, a maximum of 524
days."
Mr. Robert Ramsey, Director of International Marketing for Bell
Helicopter Textron, testified before the House Subcommittee on Science,
Research and Technology in 1980 that although Bell Textron had received
considerable assistance from the Department of Commerce export program,
the time delays experienced in the licensing procedures were detrimental to
business. He explained that his firm spent much time and effort after
normalization of relations with China arranging for the Chinese to purchase
Bell Textron helicopters. Mr. Ramsey stated that even though Bell was able
42. The announcement of the new Group P for the PRC appears in 45 Fed. Reg.
27922 (1980).
43. Interview with Dick Isadore, Office of Export Administration, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Washington, D.C. May 8, 1980.
44. See note 9 supra.
45. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Economic Policy
and Trade of the Committee on International Relations, March 14, 1979 (statement by
Fredrick W. Huszagh, Executive Director, Dean Rusk Center and Professor of Law;
Gary K. Bertsch, Senior Fellow, Dean Rusk Center and Professor of Political Science;
John R. McIntyre, Research Fellow, Dean Rusk Center).
46. Id.
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to secure an advantage over the French and West German competition, the
delay in the company's obtaining an export license seriously affected the
transfer.47 Before the Subcommittee, Mr. Ramsey testified that:
This delay, although very small in Government figures, cost us about a
$7 to $10 million advance because we could not get U.S. Government
approval to export our helicopters, although the helicopter itself was a
general destination licensed piece of equipment and it did not require a
validated license. There was a high frequency radio which was required
by the Chinese, which was a COCOM item, and as a result we were
about eight months [delayed] - we knew that we were going to get it
approved but the Chinese did not know this.48
The Export Administration Act of 1979, in an effort to remedy this
problem, has mandated specific time limits within which a license applica-
tion must be approved or denied.49 However, these so-called "guillotine"
provisions have created problems for the export agencies - especially the
Department of Defense. In some cases, licenses have been denied because
proper evaluation could not be completed within the thirty-day time limit.'
D. SHORT SUPPLY
In addition to foreign policy considerations, domestic short supply issues
were part of the rationale for the passage of the Export Control Act of 1949.
Unlike foreign policy considerations, domestic short supply rationales have
rarely been used to curtail export of goods that are in domestic scarcity for
the following reasons:
(1) short supply controls have been unable to reduce prices and
inflationary demand;
(2) they have had an adverse effect on foreign buyers and nations; and
(3) they have led to the appearance of inappropriate political pressure
by users to obtain materials at below world market prices.5'
47. Technology Transfer to China: Report of the Subcomm. on Science, Research
and Technology, 96th CONG. 2d SEsS. 24 (1980).
48. Technology Transfer to China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Re-
search and Technology, 96th CONG. 1st SEss. 82 (1980) (statement of Robert Ramsey).
49. After the Secretary of Commerce passes on to the Secretary of Defense a
license application to a controlled country, the Secretary of Defense must make a deci-
sion within thirty (30) days. EAA of 1979 § 10(g)(2).
50. See note 9 supra.
51. Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls - Past, Present, and Future,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (1967).
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Nevertheless, short supply controls were used in the summer of 1973 to
control and monitor the export of soybeans, grains, and related agricultural
products."5
E. MILITARY USE
Outside of domestic short supply and foreign policy considerations, the
principal criterion in reviewing a "validated" license application is whether
the commodity or any technology that it may embody could be put to a
significant military use." Items and activities controlled by the EAA of 1979
are crime control and detection equipment,54 aircraft55 agricultural
commodities,' terrorism," medicine,' and basic human needs. 5
III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
FOR TRADE WITH CHINA
The Carter Administration policy decision to allow the export of selected
dual-use items to China signaled an important policy change which gave
American exporters a strong indication that approval would soon be granted
on products with military "end use" applications.' "Dual-use" technology
encompasses items that are intended primarily for civilian use but which
could have potential military applications such as transport aircraft,
52. Stein, EAST-WEsT TRADE: TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE;
SURREY & WALLACE, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS at
153 (1977).
53. EAA of 1979 § 6(j).
54. EAA of 1979 §§ 6(i) and 17(c).
55. EAA of 1979 §§ 2(9), 3(11), and 7(g)(3).
56. EAA of 1979 § 6(i)(2).
57. EAA of 1979 § 6(M.
58. EAA of 1979 § 6(k).
59. EAA of 1979 § 6(k).
60. Oberdorfer, "Carter Calls Taiwan Obstacle to Sino-U.S. Ties," Wash. Post,
Sept. 4, 1981 at A4.
Following the normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations in January
1979, Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Washington and toured the
United States. The original plan had been for President Carter to return the visit
early in 1980 and for Chinese Communist Party Chief Hua Guofeng to visit
Washington and other U.S. points early this year. The taking of the U.S. hostages
in Iran caused President Carter to postpone his trip to China. Now both he and
Hua are out of power.
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helicopters, 1 flight training equipment, aerial cameras, trucks, selected
electronics, and technical data relating to these items.2
In early 1980, export guidelines for dual-use items had been relaxed to
the point where the most sophisticated high-level computer and data
processing systems could be purchased by China. In the case of computers,
several Pentagon officials believe that sales will be worked out on a
case-by-case basis. Computer sales will be dependent upon computer
capacity, end use, diversion potential, and safeguards against conversion
from civilian to military capability.'
Pentagon officials also forecast establishment of an ad hoc validated
licensing review procedure to be based on whether the country is:
61. See Department of State, Munitions Control Newsletter No. 81, March 1980;
see also AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, March 24, 1980, at 22.
62. "Bell Hopes for Further Helicopter Sales to China," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, Feb. 26, 1979 at 21. See also Bell Helicopter Lifts Off, CHINA Bus. REV., at
20-21 (Nov.-Dec. 1979). See also AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 19, 1979
at 23. See Business China, Aug. 22, 1979 at 123.
63. Barney, Export Controls: Dual Use in Focus, CHINA Bus. REV. at 6 (Jan.-Feb.
1980).
In the area of computer technology, two recent transactions exemplify the current
situation in export control regulation. In late 1973, Control Data Corporation and its
main contractor, Compagnie General Geophysique of France, concluded a $69 million
transaction with China. Twelve second-level 170 Series computers will be exported to
China for use in seismic research. Prior to the EAA of 1979, the Department of Com-
merce required license applications for each item. The new law creates the qualified
general category that will allow one license for several items. This procedure should
help to expedite the licensing process. See also note 25 supra at 4. Bo Denysyk, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration additionally stated:
In computers, for example, exports would be favorably considered for those sys-
tems with a processing data rate of 64 (a unit characterizing the amount of data
that can be processed in a second), instead of the previously allowed processing
data rate of 32. The Department of Commerce is drawing up a detailed list of
commodities with the new technical parameters and will issue them as Advisory
notes to the Regulations.
It should be pointed out, however, that in some cases it may not be appropriate to
use the factor two, since there may be no actual products at that level. For exam-
ple, the next generation of certain equipment may not be twice the level of effi-
ciency of the previous commodity, but, instead, may jump three or four levels at
one time. Also, with respect to technical data, it is not clear what twice the tech-
nical level would be for, say, a specialty steel plant. Wherever possible, the De-
partment of Commerce will issue Advisory notes and intends to use the interagen-
cy review process to establish precedential cases for those areas where the factor
two is inappropriate.
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(1) the Soviet Union;
(2) an Eastern Bloc country that has most-favored nation (MFN) status;
(3) an Eastern Bloc country that does not enjoy MFN; and
(4) Communist China.
The U.S.-China export control procedure was publicly announced and
clarified on December 29, 1981 when general guidelines on the processing of
dual-use items were promulgated." In its simplest terms, the present U.S.
export control policy toward China, the "China Preferential," requires that
when an exporter wishes to do business with China, the government must
show cause why the commodity should not be approved for sale to China. The
approach is stricter for the Soviet Union - an exporter wishing to do
business with the USSR must show cause why the sale should be approved.
This shifting burden is an obvious illustration of the new "China Preferen-
tial."
This procedure, coupled with the United States' desire to counter Soviet
aggression by expanding Sino-American political and economic ties' and by
accommodating China's preference for United States technology,' sets the
stage for expanded East-West trade where the economic rewards are viewed
in light of political, strategic, and military considerations.67
The Reagan Administration believes that the U.S. policy on trade with
China, or any country, must be viewed in terms of overall relations, and that
the strategic and political effects of that trade must be considered along with
the economic benefits." In setting trade policy, it would be foolish to assume
64. Mann, China Export Policy Takes Final Form, AvIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 25, 1982, at 57-58.
65. For an official account of current U.S. policy toward China, see U.S. Relations
with China, Current Policy No. 297, U.S. Dept. of State, July 16, 1981.
66. See also U.S. China Science and Technology Exchange, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Dept. of State, March 1981.
67. See generally Butterfield, The Pragmatists Take China's Helm, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Dec. 28, 1980. Chu, Joint Ventures Law of the People's Republic of China:
Perspectives for the the Western Legal Profession, 7 J. LEGIS. 42, 62 (1980). Theroux,
Transfer of Technology to China: New Laws and Old Problems, 14 J. OF INT'L LAW AND
ECON. 185, 251 (1980).
68. See note 24 supra (Speech by Bo Denysyk):
In an overall policy sqnse, it was in our national interest:
One, to foster a strong and secure China which is capable of deterrring potential
aggressors, a China which will contribute to peace and stability in the Asian and
Pacific region.
Second, to participate in China's economic development for the benefit of China
and American business. We have an interest in the success of China's moderniza-
tion effort, and want to have China look to us as a trusted supplier of technology
and equipment.
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that the United States will ignore its trading partners' political activities, or
that the United States will be acting alone. Consultation with our COCOM
allies and attainment of their support for a harmonized policy toward export
controls is a cornerstone of the coherent, allied approach the Reagan
Administration is formulating.
Although many large projects have stalled, U.S.-China trade has
continued to grow - doubling in 1980 for the third consecutive year. United
States exports to China in 1981 reached $5.5 billion, and are projected to
reach $6.8 billion in 1982.69 Current projections by the U.S. Department of
Commerce indicate that, by 1985, China will represent a greater market for
U.S. exports than the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe combined. 0
The following actions have already been taken by the Reagan Adminis-
tration to facilitate the export of U.S. goods to China:
(1) Export controls, liberalized during the Carter Administration, have
been further relaxed. The level of technology for which there is a
presumption of approval is now approximately twice as high as
before. Project licenses are now available for the People's Republic of
China in such categories as computers and dual-use items.
(2) The blanket prohibition against selling items on the Munitions
Control List to China has been eliminated.
(3) The Reagan Administration has committed itself to achievement of
a formal differentiation between China and the Warsaw Pact in the
COCOM.
(4) The Administration has committed itself to seeking the amendment
of statutes such as the Agricultural Trade and Development Act, the
Third, to treat China like a country whose friendship we value and whose support
we seek in our global efforts to counter aggression, terrorism and expansionism;
and
Fourth, to involve China in the search for solutions for the common problems of
mankind, such as energy, environmental quality and arms control.
69. Wren, "U.S. to Raise Technological Level of Products the Chinese Can Buy,"
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1982, § A at 1, 20 (remarks of Eugene Lawson, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for East-West Trade). See also Sinclair, W., "Farm Trade with China
Mushrooms," Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1981 at Al, A2:
Five years ago, the Peking government bought $44,000 worth of onion seeds from
the United States and that was it. This year, Chinese purchases of American farm
products are expected to pass $2.5 billion. Prospects are for even more in the fu-
ture.
China has become the largest foreign buyer of U.S. wheat ($1.1 billion last year)
and cotton ($701 million) and this year it will rank with the Soviet Union as the
third or fourth biggest customer, behind Japan and Mexico.
70. Business America, Department of Commerce, Oct. 5, 1981.
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Foreign Assistance Act, and sections of the Trade Act of 1974 that
restrict trade with China or treat it as a Soviet bloc country.
(5) The Administration has created a new joint U.S.-China committee
chaired by Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige devoted exclu-
sively to commerce and trade between the United States and China.
(6) In May, 1981, an Export-Import Bank team negotiated a framework
agreement with the Bank of China which allows the U.S. to move
forward on several preliminary loan commitments the EXIM Bank
has made for major U.S. projects in China. This, together with the
agreement concluded by the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion (OPIC) last October, means that the United States has provided
a good foundation for American investment in, and the facilitation
of financing for, United States exports to China.
(7) Pan American Airlines and China's National Flag Carrier have
opened direct air services between New York, San Francisco,
Shanghai, and Beijing. This airbridge between our two countries
symbolizes the extent to which China and the United States have,
over the past thirty months, become important trad-ing partners.
The continuation of these actions, and similar future steps, should accom-
plish much toward the normalization of the U.S. export trade with the
People's Republic of China.
